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PALEKH AND THE FORGING OF A RUSSIAN 
NATION IN THE BREZHNEV ERA
 
One of the more interesting paradoxes about post-Soviet Russia is the continuous
maintenance of Lenin’s embalmed body for viewing on Red Square. Literally and
metaphorically, Russians have not buried Lenin. His statue continues to dominate
the town square of many Russian cities and villages. His name remains attached to
countless street signs, institutes, stadiums, and factories. The example of Lenin
points to the challenge of drawing neat and tidy dividing lines around key historical
events. Political systems collapse, yet many aspects of those systems survive,
creating a symbolic and cultural landscape that endures well into the “new” era. To
be sure, no one would argue that the Bolshevik seizure of power in 1917 or the
overthrow of that power in 1991 were not momentous events which radically
transformed social, political, and especially economic structures. But what didn’t
change? What remained constant across these revolutionary divides? How were
aspects of the culture and society from the previous period integrated into the
culture and society of the following era? What, in other words, were the limits of
change and revolution?
This article addresses these questions through the village of Palekh, located
approximately 300 kilometers northeast of Moscow. Palekh is a famous community
of Russian artists. The artists of Palekh were noted for their production of
supposedly “traditional” Russian art in the late imperial and Soviet periods. Like




, an entirely new kind of





reasons for this were numerous. Foreign and domestic consumers were avid
consumers of Palekh’s imagery, which was based, by and large, on romantic visions
of Russian folk culture from the late imperial period. These consumers provided the
regime with precious foreign currency. The regime’s willingness to bolster Soviet
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legitimacy by co-opting Russian national symbols further enhanced Palekh’s
position as an official center of supposedly “traditional” Russian culture. The
village’s imagery created a symbolic safe haven from impersonal monumental art
and the features most often identified with Soviet modernization: urban blight and
the glorification of the factory milieu. Finally, the artists of Palekh deftly exploited a
nostalgic turn in Soviet culture of the 1960s. The revolution’s destruction of cultural
values, compounded by the Nazi destruction of ancient Russian monuments,
triggered an intense feeling of cultural loss. As part of this nostalgic turn, many
Soviet Russians looked beyond the 1917 revolutionary divide for cultural roots and
identity. Palekh provided an outlet for satisfying these nostalgic yearnings. In the
process, it supplied Soviet Russians with a distinctive sense of national identity
within the larger context of the multinational Soviet culture. 
By the end of the Brezhnev era, a supposedly primordial Russianness, rather
than class affiliation or international solidarity, constituted the state’s main
building block for Soviet Russian identity. In light of the Soviet Union’s
unexpected collapse, which was accompanied by the complete disintegration of its
elaborate infrastructure of cultural patronage, this development was highly ironic.
The seeming triumph of Russian cultural nationalism came at precisely the moment
when the nation’s key patron, the Soviet state, was on the verge of collapse.
Exploring the conjunction of factors behind the Brezhnev-era revival of pre-
Revolutionary Russian culture, this essay concludes by examining the dilemmas
posed by the Russian Federation’s “orphaning” of Russian national identity.
Any visitor to Russia encounters Palekh’s art — either in Russia’s many
museums or from aggressive hawkers of Russian exotica. The “classic” Palekh
lacquer boxes of the Soviet era featured Russian folk motifs, fairytales, troikas, and
firebirds — all done in the various styles of Russian Orthodox religious icons.
While this art form was a product of the 1920s, few are aware that Palekh was a
celebrated center of Russian national culture before the Bolshevik Revolution. The
peasant masters of Palekh had been painting icons continuously since at least the
sixteenth century. With the rediscovery of Russian national traditions in the
nineteenth century, the peasants of Palekh acquired fame in conservative
intelligentsia circles as living relics of an ancient and sacred national tradition. In
the reign of Nicholas II, they were patronized by Tsarist bureaucrats, who
attempted to control and direct their art for purposes of creating a distinct sense of
Russian national identity which was grounded in rural religious traditions and
opposed to secular Western culture. 
Despite its association with the official ideology of the Romanovs, Palekh’s art
not only survived the Revolution, albeit in a new medium and with new subject
matter, but it also thrived. Beginning in 1923, the Palekh masters gained a new life
as producers of Soviet folk art. Facing opponents who declared their art counter-
revolutionary, they “Sovietized” themselves by filling the old forms of Russian
Orthodox icon painting with various folk themes, most of which they borrowed from
the market for Russian exotica that had emerged in the last half of the nineteenth
century. With its pantheon of Russian folktales and peasant motifs, Palekh rejected
 




a virulently technocratic, anti-peasant system of values — even during the first five-
year plan, when industrialization and the modernization of the countryside were
rallying calls for Soviet commissars. As one Palekh artist put it in 1932, he was
determined to show a Russia that must never “live in…gigantic stone boxes,…sleep














 In a word, this producer of official
iconography, a religious icon painter turned Soviet propagandist, propagated a
vision of Russia that was anything but proletarian, technocratic, or industrial.
Surprisingly, the Palekh masters found a receptive audience for such a vision,
including important high-level officials, who frequently intervened to save the
village from its foes during the first five-year plan, and foreign consumers, who
provided valuable foreign currency with which to buy tractors and machine tools.
Palekh thus became a celebrated enclave of rural craftsmanship by the mid-1930s,
thanks to the entrepreneurial skills of the masters, high-level patronage (including
Maksim Gor´kii and Nikolai Bukharin) and foreign buyers (among them André
Malraux and Romain Rolland). 
At the same time, Palekh continued to incite political controversy. A chaotic and
improvised affair, the formation of Soviet Russian culture and identity in the Stalin
years was marked by constant debates about the relationship of the pre-




Each of Palekh’s triumphs was tainted by
the village’s association with supposedly reactionary and counter-revolutionary
traditions. Especially troubling was the proper relationship of the supposedly




 (formerly the subject of romantic
idealization among Russian populists) to the new darling of the intelligentsia, the
proletariat. In a climate of heightened debate about the contours of the new society,
national and populist conceptions of community frequently clashed with class-









 Late-imperial visions of
Russian culture and society constantly surfaced in articles, literature, and visual
imagery of the 1920s and 1930s, much to the chagrin of militant Bolshevizers. 
Unwittingly, Soviet nationalities policies in the 1920s also encouraged the
emergence of identities with an explicitly national rather than class-based
orientation. In line with the policy of “indigenization,” officials attempted to
construct Soviet communities that would be national in form but socialist in
content. They believed that socialist and proletarian content would ultimately




 Yet from the
start, party leaders disagreed on the precise nature of this synthesis — or even if
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such a synthesis was possible. What distinguished socialist content from national
form? What were the telltale signs of a genuinely socialist culture? As Martin Malia
has argued, the Soviets knew socialist culture was not capitalist, but they were less





The absence of a clear party line created an undefined space in Soviet culture, a
kind of cultural vacuum into which an astonishing array of forms and ideas
presented themselves for party inspection. Palekh’s art grew up in the vacuum of
Soviet cultural policy. Within this vacuum, many forces outside of party control
began to exert a decisive influence on Soviet Russian identity, including markets,
consumer tastes, and especially the legacy of late imperial Russian culture and its
canon of romantic Russianness. The lack of ideological clarity on the problem of
socialist identity thus nurtured a surprisingly diverse and retrospective culture —
notwithstanding the regime’s obsession with ideological purity and with escaping
the constraints of the historical past. Equally important, the lack of ideological
clarity in cultural matters allowed for a surprising level of participation and
engagement in the interpretation of Soviet Russian culture. Rather than
implementing commands from the center, culture producers very often had to
determine their own themes and approach, since commands from the center were
either vague or nonexistent. Rather than resisting the system and its dictates, they
became participants in the project of cultural construction — and their own identity
was increasingly tied to the honors and accolades offered to them by the regime. 
This chaotic process of cultural formation, and the doubts it constantly raised
about the revolutionary nature of the new culture, certainly troubled many Soviet
ideologists. Driven by a fear of counter-revolutionary backsliding, cultural officials
from the 1920s to the mid-1950s debated the supposedly counter-revolutionary
nature of Palekh’s art. This was true even in the late 1930s and through the post-war
Stalin years, when Russian national culture was supposedly privileged over all
others. Officials were especially outraged by the use of standard forms and clichés
from Russian religious icon painting and the repetition of folk motifs inspired by
the elite infatuation with Russian folk culture in the late imperial era. Typical of
attacks on Palekh was the following review of Palekh art from late 1931. The
reviewer complained that, “not one serious effort has been made to transfer the
craftsmen to producing items where one might sense the presence of Soviet
themes.” It sarcastically noted in Palekh the predominance,
 
 of the same old [images of] quaint little churches, dashing troikas, maidens
by the water well, and so forth. [It is] as if there were no Revolution, as if
everyday life was unchanged, as if there was no such thing as socialist
construction. Everywhere the same worn out motifs, covered with the dust
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The masters were urged instead to follow the mainstream style of urban socialist
realist art — or else face potentially dire consequences. The point was reinforced in
1938 by the arrest and execution of one of Palekh’s most prominent artistic
leaders — and after the war by a renewed crackdown on “traditional” Palekh
lacquers and on religious believers among the artists. 
Nonetheless, advocates of a more traditional art in Palekh survived these
attacks, due to high-level patronage and to the proven marketability of Palekh
lacquers in the West, for which the Soviet regime received precious foreign
currency. A standoff emerged, pitting advocates of tradition (mostly older artists
trained in the Tsarist era) against self-styled revolutionaries (mostly younger artists
trained in the Soviet era). After the war, a new generation of Palekh artists, many of
them trained in more mainstream socialist realist art in the 1930s, enthusiastically
joined campaigns within the Soviet art bureaucracy to purge Palekh of its
supposedly reactionary elements. These individuals believed that the artists must
decisively complete their transformation from “god-daubers,” a pejorative term for
peasant icon painters first used by Tsarist elites, and into cultured Soviet artists. In
the late 1930s, and again after the war, they waged a constant battle in the Palekh art




 who had been trained in the Tsarist
era. Their rallying call was the eradication of the old forms and themes and the
creation of a new repertoire of socialist realist topics, including the representation
of Soviet leaders, factories, and urban culture.




 who vigorously advanced their views on the proper style and content of
Palekh art — mirroring a broader phenomenon of the bold and confident war








, Palekh’s returnees from the front launched the new wave of
Palekh art, motivated by what they believed to be a new party line in the center, to









 said his “generation was raised in the
spirit of patriotism, of loyalty to the ideas of Lenin and Stalin. We genuinely










” as proof of a genuine re-forging of Palekh humanity in the
post-war period: realistic portraits of Stalin, partisans of the Great Patriotic War, a
tribute to labor in the USSR as “a matter of honor, glory, and heroism,” and a
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Back in Moscow, the vice-director of the Tret´iakov condemned an excessive
focus on historical themes and an idealized representation of pre-Revolutionary
“leaders and Tsars.” At a 1947 conference on Russian folk art, he said historical





 He urged the Palekh artists to remember that many of their
images, made for export, “were a prisoner to the petty-bourgeois ideals…in the
Western European and American artistic industry. At first glance, such themes appear
perfectly harmless but in the end turn out to be not at all harmless. We are quite
familiar with many things in which a tremendous ideological emptiness hides behind
external brilliance.” Such works, he suggested, also fall into the hands of Soviet
consumers, corrupting domestic tastes and influencing other Soviet folk artists, who




 One artist in the audience asked the vice director
“how to combine the wonderful traditions, which have developed over the centuries,
with contemporary content. Just a year and a half or even two years ago our art critics
protested against filling these…traditions with any other kind of content…How does
one explain this?” The vice director responded vaguely. “The combination of creative
traditions in such a way as to preserve them and yet to create items that are genuinely









 was G.M. Mel´nikov, who finished the
Palekh art school during the terror. When he returned to Palekh after the war, he
said he wanted to overcome the central “error” in Palekh’s art from the 1920s and
1930s — the inability to distinguish the old from the new.
It often happens that artists, drawing an image of a peasant from the old village
and the image of a collective farmer of the new village, interpret them identically,
simply adding a few incidental details, with which they want to distinguish the




Palekh artists, in his view, must depict the new Soviet men and women “so that they
reveal the new era.” The first years of the Khrushchev regime provided additional
inspiration to many of the self-styled revolutionaries of Palekh; they interpreted
Khrushchev’s attempt to rejuvenate and de-Stalinize Soviet society as a return to
the genuine roots of international socialism. On lacquer boxes they painted realistic
images of foreign communist leaders and political activists such as Mao Tse Tung
and Paul Robeson — representations that many of the older artists condemned as a










late 1953. The conflict in Borunov’s lacquer echoed the battle of generations in the
artistic collective. Borunov’s slacker was an older tractor driver who carelessly
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 in relation to their elders in Palekh, noticed the mistake, which
they immediately corrected. Borunov, wrote one reviewer, was said to be “the first
among the creative artists of the collective to depict the conflict typical of life in the
kolkhoz, and he thus revealed the great possibilities inherent in the medium of the
miniature.” Few of the older masters, however, were impressed with the
“Slacker” — or with the numerous creative works of his cohort, including “The
New Agricultural Tax,” “A Happy Childhood,” “Brotherly Aid to China,” “The




Only by the late 1950s did the tone of debates take a decisive turn against the self-
styled revolutionaries from the front. In 1958, the older leaders of the Palekh
production studio noticed a definite upgrading of Russian cultural affairs in
Moscow, which they shrewdly saw as a turning point for a more “traditional”
stylistic and thematic approach. The Central Committee had formed a “Russian
bureau” to promote Russian national culture. A new Union of Writers of the RSFSR,
a counterweight to its all-union complement, followed shortly thereafter, as did a





 As if to sanction Palekh’s pre-Revolutionary accomplishments,
the Palekhians in 1959 were called upon to restore their greatest political triumph of
the late imperial era: the elaborate murals of the Kremlin Palace of Facets, which





artists, especially those working in a more traditional manner, received greater pay,





Among other things, the rising status of the more traditional Palkeh art was linked
to the Soviet Union’s increasing contacts with the West, which provided the regime
with both foreign currency and, equally important, a sanction for the art itself.





 Soviet authorities viewed Palekh’s art as a supposedly ancient art form
that had been destroyed by the impersonal and mechanical forces of a soulless
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capitalist order. The enthusiastic reception of Palekh’s art in the West only seemed
to confirm this view. As evidence of the increasing importance of “traditional” arts
and practices in Soviet self-perception, the Soviets arranged 10 international










Soviet cultural official at an exhibit of Soviet crafts in New York in 1959 admitted
that while Soviet Union had some ground to make up in the industrial sphere, it
would never relinquish its lead “in spiritual life.” Another cultural official said:
Many foreign visitors of Soviet exhibits are surprised by the variety of manual
labor in the art industries together with a highly developed industrial
technology. The workers at our exhibits convincingly explain that in the art
industries all the decorative works are the result of the creative labor of
thousands of talented masters, whose hand gives these works that spiritual
profundity, warmth, and unique enchantment that the most perfect machine





Domestic tastes similarly aligned with foreign demand for Russian exotica,




The viewer comment books in the State Museum of Palekh art reveal an
overwhelming sense of pride and identification with the distinctly Russian
traditions of the Palekh lacquer — its evocation of religious icon-painting





 Through the 1950s and especially the 1960s, a broad cross section of
visitors — from junior-high students and cosmonauts to powerful cultural officials
in Moscow and army generals — demanded that these traditions be preserved and
propagated. They were inspired by the Nazi destruction of Russian national
monuments, which energized a nascent movement to preserve traditional Russian
culture and enhanced a profound sense of cultural loss first piqued by the revolution
itself. If some Palekhians had lingering doubts about the center’s appreciation of
Palekh’s traditions, an announcement from the Ministry of Culture of the Russian
Republic in the spring of 1959 clarified matters: it would be working with the
Palekh branch of the Union of Artists to hold a two-day seminar in Moscow on
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“The Artistry of the Palekh Miniature and the Artistic Traditions of Ancient
Russian Painting [the Soviet euphemism for Russian religious icon painting].” The
emphasis of this seminar was not the modernization of Palekh, as in earlier decades,





 Meanwhile, Palekh’s lacquer business continued to grow, bolstering new




 In 1960, retail outlets in Moscow and
Leningrad signed contracts for the delivery of 745,000 rubles worth of boxes and
exports of 300,000 rubles. Much of that went to special foreign currency shops for
the growing legions of foreign tourists. Palekh miniatures were also available in




 In accordance with the increasingly stable
Palekh canon, these items, which were now officially called “souvenirs,” depicted
Pushkin fairytales, rural idyll, Russian knights errant, troikas, Russian peasant





 Though it is impossible to say what motivated Russian
consumers to buy these souvenirs, they probably shared the sentiments of one
group of Soviet college students from Ivanovo in 1961. Visiting the State Museum
of Palekh Art, they said they saw in Palekh “the embodiment of the Russian people,
its thoughts, feelings, and desires. [The art of Palekh] was born long ago, but just as
long ago was born the optimistic and bright art form about which we are so proud,




 The market, and the
economic benefits it provided to both the regime and the artists, thus continually
drove the aesthetic choices made by the Palekh art collective, not to mention
cultural policies in the center.
Reflecting the decisive embrace of Palekh and its style, the Central
Committee in June 1961 reviewed an ambitious plan to expand Palekh’s art in
Soviet society. The plan included a host of construction projects in the village
itself, including new housing for artists, a new restaurant, art school building,
library building, bathhouse, museum building, paved sidewalks, and much
more. This outpouring of state largesse was designed “to further develop
Palekh art and raise its role in the education of the toiling masses, and also with





 At the same time, the State Museum of Palekh Art made tours of the
central cathedral in Palekh, and the icons and religious murals that it contained,
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Palekh’s secure position reflected fundamental changes in attitudes toward
aspects of Russian culture — both in the population at large and in the highest
echelons of power. Dominated by ethnic Great Russians, the party began to forge an
open alliance with conservative Russian nationalists. Building on the earlier war-
time revival of patriotic Russian culture, the Soviet state supported and co-opted the
forces of conservative Russian nationalism, whose “central features,” noted Andrei
Almalrik, “are an interest in Russianness, a belief in the messianic role of Russia and





native Palekhian Pavel Korin, an openly devout Orthodox Christian, received in
1958 the highest title for a Soviet artist: a People’s Artist of the USSR. The KGB
finally closed their long investigation of Korin in January 1961. After four decades
of constant surveillance, the secret police concluded that Korin, like Palekh itself, no




 In December 1962 the artist Il´ia
Glazunov told a sympathetic ideological commission of the Central Committee
about the shameful neglect of Russian national traditions, especially Russian
Orthodox churches and icons. “How will we develop patriotic pride, what will we
love,” he lamented, if the regime allowed priceless treasures of church architecture
and art to perish. “A genuine artist-creator should believe in the life-creating forces
of his native country, he should search for creative inspiration in the bright




 The title of one laudatory article devoted to
Palekh in January 1964 embodied the more emphatic embrace of Russian national





 The appearance of such a headline in a newspaper of the late Stalin era, or
even in the mid-1950s, would have been framed in ironic quotes. Almost certainly,
it would have signaled an attack on Palekh’s lack of Soviet spirit.
Perhaps less surprising than the party’s alliance with Great Russian nationalism
was that this alliance took so long to come about — especially given the surge of
Russian patriotic sentiment and Russian Orthodox belief in World War II. Marxist
ideology, which disdained rural traditions and privileged class over nation, was a
major reason. Seen through the prism of Palekh, Leninist ideology and its disdain for
Russian muzhik culture had a surprisingly enduring impact. Since 1917, the
Palekhians faced wave after wave of hostile campaigns from Moscow, which were
directed against the supposedly “archaic” and reactionary traditions of the Russian
peasantry and countryside. Equally important, the Soviets confronted the challenge
of ruling a multi-ethnic empire, which meant imposing limits on Great Russian
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nationalist sentiments to maintain manageable relations between Russians and non-
Russians. 
Yet the symbols and traditions of Great Russian national culture continued to
attract support, especially compared with the increasingly cliché-ridden and
formalistic rituals of Soviet culture in the Brezhnev era — or the perceived




 Khrushchev’s infamous attacks on abstract,
foreign, and modernist art in December 1962 at the Manezh exhibit illustrated high-
level attitudes that directly benefited the Palekh masters. After the outburst, the
Central Committee Secretary L.F. Ilyichev told a gathering of artists in Moscow
that, “the Leninist principles of the Party and folk nature of art are and will continue
to be the foundation of our Party’s policy in the sphere of the development of
socialist culture.” Khrushchev, in March 1963, noted that he grew up on Russian





 The hamlet was thus aligned with cultural policies in which the
Russian cultural legacy (minus its avant-garde and modernists strains) was








A new generation of Palekh artists was empowered by the official turn to Russian
folk culture. For the new Palekh masters of the late 1950s and 1960s, de-




 who interpreted de-Stalinization as a return to the revolution’s
international and cosmopolitan roots. The neo-traditionalists imagined the late
Stalin era and the early Khrushchev years as a dark period in which de-racinated
and de-nationalized bureaucrats supposedly tormented supporters of national
tradition. Confident of support from Moscow, they took the offensive against the
previous generation of artists who had called for the complete restructuring of
Palekh’s art. Self consciously restoring the traditions that they believed had been
threatened by the perceived imposition of “socialist realism” in earlier decades,
new traditionalists looked to the Russian icon and Russian folklore as the
foundation of their art. “We began to return to the essence of the style,” said Aleksei
Dmitrievich Kochupalov, who studied to become a master from 1955 to 1961. He
and his cohort “began to purge the rubbish from [our art]…the tractors, combines,
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Their ally in Moscow was the art critic Mariia Nekrasova, who believed the
more realistic Palekh art of the earlier period was “a pedestal for loud and banal
compositions.” Resorting to classic Soviet techniques of argumentation, Nekrasova
said Palekh images of Soviet construction projects and Stakhanovites, whose
position in Palekh’s production she grossly exaggerated, “were polluted with petty-
bourgeois tastes” and “crippled the souls of people” who came to view such
imagery at museum displays. She condemned attempts to find a new style and
thematic content as “pseudo-innovation.” In her view, the earlier Soviet period was
the dark age of Palekh art, when “in essence…the language of [this] original art,”
like Russia itself, “was destroyed.”40 
According to one Palekh artist, many artists after the mid-1960s considered
themselves part of the neo-populist and “pochvenniki” sentiments in some
educated Russian circles. They read the works of the so-called “village writers,”
authors such as Valentin Rasputin, Vasilii Belov, and Viktor Astaf´ev, who
celebrated peasant folk culture and lamented the disintegration of Russian village
life. Through the 1960s, the thick journal Molodaia gvardiia, a bastion of Russian
nationalism under high-level party protection, was obligatory reading for the new
generation of Palekh masters, who waged a battle within their own collective
against the front-line servicemen. In 1966, the Russian nationalist Vladimir
Soloukhin published in its pages a piece “which sought to dramatize the neglect of
ancient Russian architecture and to cultivate an appreciation of Russian icons.” The
journal subsequently published numerous letters inspired by Soloukhin’s lament.41
As one Palekh artist recalled, “there was created an entire generation of artists” who
sang the praises of Russian peasant life and folklore. Anyone who disagreed with
their position risked being branded anti-Russian and anti-Soviet.42
The new generation also drew inspiration from a popular movement to preserve
monuments of Russian national culture, which gained many adherents among the
Russian youth of the 1960s. While restructuring had been the rallying call of cultural
practice in the late Stalin era and even much of the 1950s, preservation gradually
became the dominant slogan by the 1960s. Preservationists believed, according to
one scholar of Russian nationalism, that “preservation equals patriotism; anti-
preservation equals national nihilism.” Co-opting popular demands for the
preservation of Russian monuments, the regime in 1964 approved creation of the
“Homeland” (Rodina) club to promote historical preservation. The Palekhian Pavel
Korin helped spearhead the effort, which acquired the name All-Russian Society for
the Preservation of Historical and Cultural Monuments, established by a decree of
40. M. Nekrasova, “Vtoroe rozhdenie,” Prizyv (3 February 1994):2-3; Viktor Golov, “Palekh:
Upadok ili vozrozhdenie?” Prizyv (4 July 1995):2; M. Nekrasova, “Poetika Palekha,”
Sovetskaia kul´tura (8 December 1964):3; M. Nekrasova, “Predmet i miniatiura,”
Dekorativnoe iskusstvo SSSR, n° 2 (1959): 17-20.
41. John B. Dunlop, The faces of contemporary Russian nationalism (Princeton, N. J.:
Princeton University Press, 1983): 67-68.
42. Unpublished paper by the Palekhian Valerii Iuskov, 31 May 1997, in the personal archive
of Mikhail Larionov.
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the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR. The group’s first conference was held in
June 1966, and the ranks of this voluntary society grew rapidly, numbering seven
million members in 1972 and 12 million in 1977, or nearly 10% of the population of
the Russian Republic. Among other things, the society published pamphlets and
brochures on the importance of preservation, promoted indigenous tourism to
Russia’s “Golden Ring,” and collected materials related to Russian folk culture.43
While Palekh’s earlier jubilees tended to emphasize the village’s incomplete
Sovietization, Palekh’s jubilees in 1964/1965 and 1974/1975 were pure celebration.
These jubilees were celebrated in accordance with the founding of the Palekh “Artel
of Ancient Painting” in December 1924. In 1964, the former Palekhian and People’s
Artist of the Soviet Union, Pavel Korin, proclaimed that Palekh had a golden touch.
While Midas turned everything into gold, everything the Palekhians touched
became beautiful.44 Scores of artists received honorific titles. Municipal authorities
in Moscow named a street after Palekh. Bards of the popular press composed
couplets in honor of the hamlet and its art. In the mid-1960s, a group of more than
100 Palekh masters formed an amateur choir called “The Folk Choir of the Town of
Palekh.” The Soviet record company Melodiia issued a collection of their songs. The
group performed on union-wide Soviet television, dressed in traditional Russian
peasant costume designed by local seamstresses.
When the choir performs the stage disappears. In its place appears a fairytale
place…where the central actors are similar to those in fairytales…It seemed as if
they had just emerged from ‘folk choir’ lacquer miniatures, and having sung
their song, they then went back from whence they came.45 
When the local authorities in Palekh decided in 1966 to erect marble plaques in
honor of six founders of the 1924 Artel of Ancient Painting (the seventh, Aleksandr
Zubkov, was omitted since he was shot as an enemy of the people in 1938), Pravda
believed the event was worthy of union-wide coverage. It called the founding
masters the “‘Patriarchs’ of Palekh.”46 By 1974, about 170 masters produced an
astounding 22,000 boxes annually — nearly 130 boxes for each master. Each year,
an average of 15 new masters graduated from the Gor´kii School of Palekh Art and
joined the collective. For their 50th jubilee in 1974 Palekhians requested and
received more trips abroad to accompany their exhibits, more funding for separate
“cottages” for leading masters, more control over forming their exhibits, and more
business in new media. In a sea of collective farm poverty, Palekh was becoming a
banner of rural Russian creativity and soul.47 A Soviet passenger liner, in honor of
43. J. B. Dunlop, The faces of contemporary Russian nationalism, op. cit.:64-66, 72-75.
44. P. Korin, “Palekhu 40 let,” Dekorativnoe iskusstvo SSSR, n° 12 (1964): 1.
45. “Ulitsa Palekhskaia v Moskve,” Prizyv (16 February 1988):4; Pavel Solonin, Zdravstvui,
Palekh! Liricheskie etiudy o masterakh russkikh lakov iz malen´kogo poselka sredinnoi Rossii
(Iaroslavl´: Verkhne-Volzhskoe knizhnoe izdatel´stvo, 1974):157-158.
46. “‘Patriarkham’ Palekha,” Pravda (21 February 1966):6.
47. Nikolai Rodichev, “Gnezdo zhar-ptitsy,” Sovetskaia kul´tura (19 November 1974): 5.
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Palekh’s 50th jubilee in late 1974, was named after Palekh; in a cruel irony, it sank
in 1992. The Palekhians, in fact, were so confident of their status in socialist society
that they referred to Palekh art as simply: “Palekh realism.”48 
For Palekh, the Brezhnev period of “stagnation,” as Gorbachev later put it, was
thus a truly golden era.49 Continuity with the past, rather than a radical break,
became a central theme of cultural construction. “Palekh,” noted one journalist,
“became for all of us one of the symbols of Russian culture, of its national
traditions, of the depths of its historical roots.”50 The central journal on Soviet
cultural affairs seconded the thought, noting that the story of Palekh “is about
families who not only have not lost their connection with the past, but who also, as
it were, gained strength with the passing of generations.”51 The popular journal
Ogonek in 1974 summed up Palekh’s secure status in the heartland of Soviet
Russian culture. Noting the masters’ many triumphs, the journal remarked, “it is
hard to believe that not so long ago [Palekh] had many influential enemies.”52
Sheer fatigue also took a toll on Palekh’s home-grown restructurers. The
sources of the late 1950s and early 1960s suggest a longing for stability and
consensus, which was reflected in a new reluctance in Palekh to air differences in
public forums — and in the broader culture by a growing weariness with ceaseless
ideological campaigns and mobilizations.53 True, some artists in the Brezhnev
period continued to paint boxes on more modern themes and in a non-traditional
style (especially of cosmonauts), but in very limited numbers and with limited
economic success. Even frontoviki turned more and more to fairytale themes and
the traditional style. With advancing age and a seeming consensus in the center,
they gained a new appreciation of their own roots. The emergence of a new
consensus about Palekh’s traditions thus signaled that the cultural transformation in
the Russian heartland was an accomplished fact. Palekh had entered the phase that
Brezhnev called “developed socialism” and Gorbachev later dubbed “stagnation.”
The Soviet Russian synthesis was nearly complete — although what made it Soviet
was far from clear.
48. Nikolai Zinov´ev used the term “Palekh realism” in a special issue of the Ivanovo oblast´
newspaper devoted entirely to Palekh: Rabochii krai (13 December 1974): 2.
49. Glowing press coverage marked Palekh’s golden age. See, for example, Iu. Rudnitskaia,
review of Aleksandr Navozov, Palekhskoe chudo. Rasskazy o khudozhnikakh (Iaroslavl´:
Verkhne-Volzhskoe knizhnoe izdatel´stvo, 1970), in Don, n° 2 (1972): 185, 187; or another
review of the same book by G. Sukharev, “Odno iz chudes...,” Volga, n° 7 (1971): 172.
50. “Problemy sovremennogo Palekha: kruglyi stol,” Dekorativnoe iskusstvo SSSR, n° 12
(1974):10.
51. Nikolai Radichev, “Gnezdo zhar-ptitsy,” Sovetskaia kul´tura (19 November 1974):5.
52. Iurii Melent´ev, “Bylinnost´ i ogon´ sovremennosti,” Ogonek, n° 50 (1974): 8.
53. GAIO, f. 2977, op. 2, d. 38, l. 29; f. 2976, op.2, d.20, l.3-6; GMPI, f.Sobolevskii,
unpublished autobiography of A.V. Kovalev, l. 241. 
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The nostalgic turn in Brezhnevite culture
 As Palekh’s status as a crown jewel of Soviet Russian culture solidified in the 1960s,
a native Palekh master took on the task of defining the traditions that now seemed to
have such a secure future. The individual was Nikolai Mikhailovich Zinov´ev (1888-
1979), known in press accounts as “the last of the Mohicans” and “the magician of
Diaghilev” (a settlement one and a half kilometers from Palekh, where Zinov´ev
lived).54 Zinov´ev’s personal story illustrates another key factor behind the revival of
late imperial culture in the 1960s and 1970s: an increasingly nostalgic turn which
prompted many Soviet Russians to look beyond the 1917 revolutionary divide for
identity and culture. This nostalgic turn came against the backdrop of an official
culture which many Soviets found sterile, uninviting, and “soulless.” 
Like so many other Palekh masters from the 1920s, Zinov´ev’s artistic
development began in the 1890s as a painter of religious icons in the private icon
studios of Palekh. Inspired by the example of many other Palekhians, especially the
“Wanderer” Aleksei Mikhailovich Korin, he abandoned his apprenticeship in the
private icon studio system and entered Nicholas II’s new icon committee school in
1902, which was created by the Tsar and his conservative advisors to counteract the
supposedly corrupting influences of mechanization and Catholic imagery. Like his
fellow Palekhian Pavel Korin, Zinov´ev enrolled in the Tsar’s new icon school to
hone his craft but also to learn the techniques of academic and secular painting. It
was thus at the turn of the century that Zinov´ev, with the help of the Tsarist state
and conservative Russian nationalist intellectuals, began realizing his dream of
becoming a national artist — rooted in a sacred and supposedly “ancient” tradition,
yet also conversant with the demands of a more modern and secular art. 
To realize his ambition, Zinov´ev traveled to Moscow and St. Petersburg in
1907, supporting himself by working in icon studios. In his spare time he studied
secular artists, especially the Russian “neo-realists” Mikhail Nesterov (the teacher
of another prominent Palekhian, Pavel Korin) and Viktor Vasnetsov. Like his idols,
he attempted to integrate the traditions of Russian religious art and folk culture with
a more academic approach, including a job on the eve of World War I to paint an
elaborate series of religious murals at the Novyi Afon monastery in the Caucasus.55
Zinov´ev’s pre-Revolutionary training prepared the young artist surprisingly well
for the Soviet period. At the heart of Soviet Palekh’s national synthesis, which
Zinov´ev more than any other master helped create and sustain from the 1920s to
his death in 1979, was the integration of Russian Orthodox aesthetic traditions, the
modern technique and ethos of secular art (especially the attribution of authorship
lacking in traditional religious icon painting), and Russian folk themes.56 Of course,
54. Aleksandr Navozov, Palekhskoe chudo (Moscow: Sovetskaia Rossiia, 1976):133. In 1984
his house was converted into a museum.
55. O. Zhurikhina, “Smysl zhizni — tvorchestvo,” Prizyv (4 May 1988):2-3; GAIO, f. 372, op.
1, d.1, l.1.
56. A. Navozov, “On byl chelovekoliubtsem,” Prizyv (24 May 1988):2.
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adding new “socialist” content to this art represented a significant departure from
the last decades of the Romanovs. Yet even here, the Palekhians drew on much of
the emerging canon of folk motifs and ideas from the imperial era, especially the
folk images popularized by artists such as Vasnetsov and I. Ia. Bilibin and the
popular fairytales of Pushkin. Moreover, the Palekhians themselves were
increasingly treated as “folk” artists in the rule of Nicholas II and not simply
painters of holy images. Switching in the Soviet era from Christian themes to
Russian folk topics was therefore not such a radical or illogical shift for Zinov´ev,
who was deeply influenced by Russia’s great nineteenth century artists and their
own growing infatuation with Russian folk culture. Like many other Palekhians,
his understanding of Soviet Russian culture was thus a product of his own
experiences and training from the late imperial era, which he actively propagated to
the younger generation.
In the 1940s and 1950s, Zinov´ev launched another career as a journalist, writer,
and propagandist of Palekh art. He publicly opposed himself to many of the front-
line servicemen who following the war advocated Palekh’s strict adherence to the
conventions of Soviet socialist realist art — and he inspired many newer younger
masters to defend Palekh’s “ancient traditions.” In all these activities Zinov´ev was
inspired by a single mission: to preserve the style of Russian Orthodox icon painting,
especially in the face of pressures from his opponents locally and in Moscow who
believed that these traditions had no place in Soviet Russian society. As part of that
effort, Zinov´ev by the mid-1950s devoted much of his time to bringing his views of
the Palekh art and style to the more general reading public — and to the intelligentsia
of Moscow and Leningrad. Thus began his odyssey, as he put it in a letter in
September 1956, “to sum up my work,” by which he meant publishing his thoughts
on Palekh.57 The project consisted of a large body of written material composed by
Zinov´ev from the early 1950s and until his death in 1979 and contained three
elements. The first assembled Zinov´ev’s “conversations” with beginning Palekh art
students in manuscript form. Those conversations, which Zinov´ev said in a letter to
potential publishers “would be as if I were conducting a conversation on Palekh with
the people,” covered everything from the history of Palekh (before and after 1917)
to the problem of modernity and innovation in Palekh art.58 The second aspect of his
ambitious project involved a detailed description of the technique and style of the
lacquer miniature and its organic connection with the Russian icon-painting
traditions. It was a kind of how-to production book, complete with a dictionary of
specialized terms, consciously modeled after the Russian Orthodox podlinniki (style
manuals) used by Palekh icon painters before 1917. Finally, Zinov´ev recorded
memories of both his own life before the Revolution and those of his cohort. The
memoirs were a self-conscious effort to correct what he (and many other Palekhians)
felt was the widespread misrepresentation of Palekh’s pre-Revolutionary history by
outsiders. The People’s Artist and native of Palekh Pavel Korin enthusiastically
57. RGALI, f. 2283, d. 80, l. 5.
58. GAIO, f. 372, op. 2, d. 9, l. 4.
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endorsed Zinov´ev’s alteration of the conventional history of Soviet Palekh. In an
introduction to one of Zinov´ev’s books, Korin said Zinov´ev “correctly and
convincingly conveyed the spirit and life of the old pre-Revolutionary Palekh,” by
which Korin meant its positive rather than negative aspects.59
Zinov´ev spent years searching for publishers of one proposed work called simply
The art of Palekh.60 With the aid of high-level patrons, including the famous artist
Aleksandr Deineka and the art critic Mikhail Sokol´nikov, the book finally went to
press in 1968 at the publisher “Khudozhnik RSFSR” — and to Zinov´ev’s great
delight and vindication its 10,000 copies immediately sold out.61 A second edition
followed in 1974 in 20,000 copies and was also sold out. In the process, Zinov´ev
discovered a major ally of pre-Revolutionary art and mythology: the Soviet
consumer.
Perhaps the most striking aspect of Zinov´ev’s book is its love-hate relationship
with the late imperial era that emerges as both the source of all Palekh’s problems
and the foundation of its cultural renaissance. According to the Soviet convention,
culture supposedly declined rapidly and became decadent and depraved following
the 1861 emancipation and the rapid development of capitalism. The artistic
traditions of Palekh (and elsewhere) thus experienced a “decline” (upadok) — a
term actually first applied to Palekh by Tsarist elites in the 1880s.62
Zinov´ev was determined to get the story straight. In a letter pitching his
manuscript he noted that the first part of the book would describe “the great masters
who brought the traditions of ancient-Russian painting up to the October
Revolution and thereby laid down the path and created the firm basis for the
flowering of new Soviet Palekh art.”63 He wanted to focus especially on the life and
times of the many talented Palekh masters and icon-studio owners with whom he
had associated before 1917, whose portrayal until then, he said bluntly, was
“inaccurate.”64
The published book, like the lectures Zinov´ev had been giving for decades to
Palekh art students, remained largely true to his proposal, although he did make
compromises. While recounting the supposedly ruthless oppression of masters by
the local icon moguls, most of the book’s descriptions of pre-Revolutionary Palekh
and its masters actually suggested the opposite. The majority of Palekhians, wrote
Zinov´ev, were homeowners and had land to farm. Palekh had a vibrant system of
trade and “was famous for being an enterprising village,” where one could buy all
59. N. M. Zinov´ev, Iskusstvo Palekha, 2nd edition (Leningrad: Khudozhnik RSFSR, 1974):5,
15.
60. GAIO, f. 372, op. 2, d. 9, l. 9-11.
61. Ibid., d. 10, l. 1; d. 13, l. 12. Deineka read and enjoyed Zinov´ev’s manuscript.
62. O. S. Popova, “Narodnoe dekorativnoe-prikladnoe iskusstvo,” Sovetskaia etnografiia, n° 5
(1957):108; V. Kotov, “Muzei Palekhskogo iskusstva,” Tribuna Palekha (11 November
1954):2; V. Kotov, “Odno iz chudes revoliutsii,” Nauka i religiia, n°1 (1961):26-30; Nik.
Kruzhkov, “Paleshane,” Ogonek, n° 6 (1965): 24; GAIO, f. 2875, op. 3, d. 9, l. 1.
63. GAIO, f. 372, op. 2, d. 9, l. 4.
64. Ibid., l. 9.
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sorts of things. Contrary to the notion that the icon craft was being increasingly
monopolized by greedy capitalists, Zinov´ev noted that pre-Revolutionary Palekh
had a wide range of icon studios and employers. Some, he wrote, “were vicious
exploiters and looked upon their business as a source of profit,” but others were
deeply committed to the art and gave the masters many creative opportunities.
“They paid the best of the icon painters well, carefully preserved the ancient
traditions, fulfilled orders honestly, and created new types of work.” Moreover,
masters had the freedom to work in various styles.65
Zinov´ev ended his story “About Old Palekh” with a plea to re-evaluate the
contributions of the late imperial period to Palekh’s art — and to Soviet Russian
culture. Listing the names of dozens of “humble laborers” from Palekh in the field
of religious icon painting at the turn of the century, he said “thanks to them [...] the
art of Soviet Palekh was able to be born.” In his lectures to all first-year students in
the Gor´kii School of Palekh Art from the 1950s and 1960s he made precisely the
same point, recounting the names of nearly 100 masters from the era of “decline”
who had contributed to the “Renaissance of Palekh art after 1917.”66 Rather than
calling his fellow pre-Revolutionary Palekhians “god daubers,” he treated them as
accomplished national artists.
Zinov´ev’s effort to retrieve a usable imperial past, however much it
contradicted the obligatory Soviet trope of darkness to light, suggested a growing
nostalgic turn. True, the Soviets had always allowed part of the “progressive” past
to be integrated into the “new” socialist culture. But they drew the line at the last
three decades of imperial power, in which the progressive development of
capitalism necessarily meant the intense degradation of culture. That line in the late
1960s and 1970s was fading fast, blurred by an increasingly retrospective
orientation in Soviet Russian society.
Sensing that his biological clock was running on borrowed time, Zinov´ev
continued to expand his project — the fruits of which were actually realized
posthumously. His work on The stylistic traditions of the art of Palekh was
published in 1981.67 It provided a detailed analysis, with his own sketches and
drawings, of the links between the standard elements of religious Russian icon
painting and the Soviet Palekh miniature.68 Meanwhile, Zinov´ev continued writing
his memoirs until his death in 1979. Some of this work was edited and published in
1987. Adding to the charm of Zinov´ev’s work, noted the book’s editor, was their
conveyance “in a somewhat old-fashioned language,” which complemented the
increasingly nostalgic and positive treatment of the late imperial period. In his
65. N. M. Zinov´ev, Iskusstvo Palekha, op. cit.:16-17, 27.
66. GAIO, f. 372, op. 1, d. 18, l. 17-18, 19a; d. 29, l. 6.
67. N. M. Zinov´ev, Stilisticheskie traditsii iskusstva Palekha (Leningrad: Khudozhnik
RSFSR, 1981).
68. Interestingly, though many Palekhians applauded publication of the work, some also were
afraid that anyone with some artistic talent might pick up Zinov´ev’s “Authentic” and use it as a
guide for making their own “imitation” Palekh lacquers. Interview with Anna Aleksandrovna
Kotukhina, 5 January 2000, Palekh.
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memoirs, Zinov´ev recounted the paths of each of ten “founders of Soviet Palekh
art” as a continuous process of acquiring and mastering the traditions. The process,
in Zinov´ev’s story, began in the last decades of imperial power, which provided the
masters with a schooling in icon painting but also instilled a desire to achieve fame
in secular national art. Rather than opening new vistas, the October Revolution, like
the war before it, appears in Zinov´ev’s account much like an obstacle in a fairytale:
a challenge to be overcome so that the journey, and the story, can continue. Ever
resourceful and determined to finish their transformation into artists and yet preserve
the ancient traditions, the masters found a new medium and new business in the
1920s — and through their own efforts, they forged their own rightful place in
Soviet Russian society, though one would be hard pressed to find much of anything
Soviet in Zinov´ev’s tale. In the end, these stories paid tribute to Palekh itself and the
talent and ingenuity of the masters.69 At the twilight of his life, and of the Soviet
Union, the Palekhian Zinov´ev thus wrote a story in which the standard Soviet
darkness-to-light story had lost almost all relevance and explanatory power. Far
from writing Palekh into the “master narrative” of the October Revolution, he was
simply writing his own story — and getting it published. And like the art of Palekh
itself, Zinov´ev’s rehabilitation of the late imperial era struck a nostalgic chord
among Soviet consumers. His nostalgic turn was symptomatic of a fundamental
change in Soviet Russian culture in the last two decades of Soviet power — its
increasing willingness to embrace more and more of the Russian past as part of the
“progressive” national legacy. 
The flip side of this wistful vogue was that the “Soviet” half of “Soviet Russian”
lost much of its appeal. What did it meant to be Soviet? By the 1960s and 1970s
Soviet culture had become increasingly cliché-ridden and ritualistic, remote and
formalistic. Even Soviet specialists in the production of Soviet rites and festivals
admitted that new Soviet cultural practices were “too uniform, impersonal,
overweighted with speeches and lacking in symbolism.”70 While the cult of Lenin
proliferated, so, too, did jokes about communism and Lenin. For many Great
Russians, Russian national symbols and traditions, among them the collection and
worship of icons, had become far more compelling than those of a more recent
Soviet vintage. Perhaps appropriately, this growing level of comfort and
identification with pre-Revolutionary Russia coincided with the beginning of the
end of the Soviet era in Palekh. Zinov´ev, who had come of age under Tsarist
power, missed this dramatic turn of events in 1989 by a mere decade — in what
would have been his 101st year. But in more than one way he had already realized
his pre-Revolutionary ambitions — thanks to the resources and support of Soviet
authorities, who offered him, at the age of 86, the highest of all honors for a Soviet
artist, the coveted People’s Artist of the Soviet Union.71
69. M. A. Tikhomirova, Nikolai Mikhailovich Zinov´ev. Khudozhnik Palekha (Leningrad:
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A final restructuring: living and dying on the market
Ironically, political and economic collapse came at the moment of seeming Russian
national triumph. Thanks in part to state sanction and support, by the mid-1980s the
All-Russian Society for the Preservation of Historical and Cultural Monuments had
nearly 40 million members. The All-Russian Society for the Preservation of Nature
boasted 15 million members. About 50 million Soviets belonged to the Russian
Orthodox Church, itself a testimonial to the growing spiritual void in official Soviet
life.72 
The results of the 1979 census further mobilized support for Russian national
symbols. According to trends clearly noted in the census, birth rates among Great
Russians were declining while those of non-Russians, especially the Muslim
Central Asians, were on the rise. As a percentage of the Soviet Union’s overall
population, Great Russians were becoming a minority nationality. Threatened by
the loss of majority status, many Russians redoubled demands for the support and
preservation of distinctly Russian national traditions.73 
Not coincidentally, Soviet officials — especially Palekh’s key political patron
Iurii Serafimovich Melent´ev, a Russian nationalist and minister of culture for the
Russian Federation in the late 1970s — continued to pump resources into the
village, giving it the required visage of plenty and comfort befitting a Russian rural
utopia. First on the agenda was a new production studio, where the master
craftsmen would work in an appropriately public and modern facility. At the
insistence of Prime Minister Kosygin, work on the new studio began in the 1970s
and dragged on through the beginning of the Gorbachev era. An immense structure
made from quality Estonian brick, an extreme rarity in the Russian province, the
new studio was to be the defining structure of the village. It incorporated a new
hotel (to replace the old hotel built in the 1960s), workspaces for the more than
200 masters, a conference center devoted to folk art, and a fitness center.74 
 While the regime built the new studio and transformed the houses of dead
Palekh masters into museums, it also commissioned dozens of architectural
projects for a grandiose new museum complex. Melent´ev, the nationalist Minister
of Culture for the Russian Federation, pushed for a design that clearly evoked
Russian national elements. The two-story plan eventually approved (though never
built due to the Soviet Union’s collapse) incorporated elements from Russian
church architecture. The plan envisioned a coat check area capable of holding
500 coats, cafeteria and buffet, 2,000 square meters of exhibit space, lecture and
movie hall, a concert hall, a library with 50,000 books, archive, reading hall, and
restoration studios. Melent´ev also proposed transforming the Gor´kii School of
72. J. B. Dunlop, The new Russian nationalism (New York: Praeger, 1985):2-3, 10-14.
73. Bohdan Nahaylo and Victor Swoboda, Soviet disunion: A history of the nationalities
problem in the USSR (New York: The Free Press, 1990):362-363.
74. Interview with the Palekh master Boris Kukuliev, 30 May 2000, Palekh; Nikolai Rodichev,
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Palekh Art into a full-fledged institute (Gor´kii had been a key Palekh patron in the
1930s), complete with a program for studying the history and future application of
Palekh’ traditions and a “laboratory” for experiments in ancient Russian art.75
To accentuate the primordial Russianness of the hamlet, its “fairytaleness,” as
one journalist put it, the regime in the late Brezhnev era began building a park in
Palekh devoted to Russian peasant wooden architecture.76 It planned fifteen
objects, to be disassembled from around Russia and reassembled on the grounds
near the Elijah the Prophet Church — which in the late 1960s was also upgraded
from a warehouse to an official monument of Russian national culture. Plans
included a 15th century peasant wooden church. In the end, only one of the 15
planned structures, a peasant wooden mill, was installed before the beginning of the
collapse of the Soviet Union.77 
In the meantime, the long-awaited new studio and conference center was nearing
completion in the Gorbachev era after more than a decade of continuous construction.
It represented the culmination of attempts to transform Palekh into a village academy,
which in many respects had begun decades before the revolution. The building was a
mammoth brick structure, occupying an entire field above the Elijah the Prophet
Church, next to the open-air museum of Russian peasant architecture. Unexpectedly,
however, as the heating was turned on for the building in 1989, the village
experienced an event that locals immediately dubbed “the schism” (raskol), which in
turn threatened the legitimacy of Palekh’s hard-won synthesis of Russian and Soviet
culture. The pretext for the split came in early 1989, when one of the leading artists
had accompanied an exhibit of Palekh art to the United States and made a shocking
discovery: the sale price of his art, as indicated in an English-language catalogue, was
magnitudes greater than his wages. In the spirit of glasnost´, he took a copy of the
price list of Palekh lacquers for American consumers back to the hamlet, showed it to
his colleagues, and began complaining loudly and publicly about the theft of his
labor. In the spirit of Brezhnevite stagnation, the Palekh production studios, the one
and only artistic business in town, fired him. 
Under the banner of perestroika, the “raskol´nik” therefore started a new
organization, which quickly attracted many artists. The upstarts pitched their new
organization as the only rightful heir to the “artel” of the founding seven Palekh
masters in December 1924, mirroring the broader search in the late 1980s for a
“NEP alternative,” when socialism supposedly had a human face. “We have thrown
off the yoke of the creative dictatorship created by the Generallisimus,” they
proclaimed. The administrators of Palekh, they declared in the spirit of Soviet anti-
bureaucratic campaigns, were part of a “heartless bureaucratic machine,” an
“administrative command system” incapable of reform.78 “Palekh belongs to no
75. V. Kotov, “Est´ li budushchee u sela-akademii?” Prizyv (5 January 1995):2.
76. Undated newspaper clip from the early 1970s in the Palekh newspaper Prizyv, contained in
the library of GMPI.
77. V. Kotov, “Est´ li budushchee u sela-akademii?” Prizyv (27 December 1994):2.
78. K. Kochetov, “Vmesto ili vmeste?” Prizyv (30 March 1989):2.
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ministries, funds, or art unions! We have had it with bureaucrats. It is time to decide
our own fate, the fate of the industry.”79 
Interestingly, many of the rebels were among the most prominent older party
members from the postwar period, including those who had struggled for more
modern content and style in Palekh art from the 1930s to the mid-1950s. By
contrast, those who stayed behind in the old Soviet collective were many of the
masters of the 1960s who had fought for, and won, a decisive return to the
“traditional” style of Palekh’s art (which had never really been abandoned). The
schism was thus framed in the familiar Palekhian opposition of tradition versus
modernity. Neither side, however, claimed to be anti-Soviet — indeed, just the
opposite.80 
Pecuniary motives and the absence of central authority quickly accelerated the
process of division, which Soviet authorities had artificially stymied for 70 years.81
At first, two new organizations competed for the spoils of the Palekh trade, but soon
other artists, taking advantage of the new opportunities for small-time private
commerce allowed by the economic reforms, formed their own groups.82 And
everyone seemed to be making money. For the first time since the imperial era,
masters were legally free to work for themselves.83 Foreign collectors and traders of
lacquers entered directly into negotiations with artists, to whom they promised (and
often delivered) princely sums (by Russian standards). The easing of restrictions on
travel, and the eagerness of many emigres from the Soviet Union to cash in on new
opportunities, created new distribution and sales outlets for artists. The popularity
of Gorbachev in Europe and the United States triggered a boom in Russian exotica.
Some artists began painting religious icons. Some produced “classic” lacquers of
Pushkin fairytales. Some catered to a curious byproduct of perestroika, the growth
of strong demand for “socialist realist” lacquers as reflections of a dying art form:
images of tractors, Lenin, and even the Generalissimus Stalin. 
In the meantime, the newly completed studio — the showcase of the new era of
communal labor in the Soviet Russian heartland — closed as soon as it was opened.
The single cooperative organization to which it belonged no longer existed. Almost
immediately, Palekhians began their own process of privatization, securing bricks
from the structure for the many fancy new cottages (kottedzhy) that began
sprouting up around Palekh like mushrooms after the proverbial rain. Like the ruins
of Rome in the Dark Ages, the new studio served as building material for the new
order. It stands today as a fitting tribute to the Soviet era: a cannibalized skeleton,
79. V. Garov, “Plakha dlia Palekha,” Trud (7 October 1989):2.
80. V. Zotov, “Ne o forme, no o soderzhanii,” Prizyv (18 May 1991):3-4; V.Kotov, “V ego
iskusstve est´ dusha,” Prizyv (3 December 1991):1-2; V. Kotov, “Kak zazhech´ putevodnuiu
zvezdu,” Prizyv (25 November 1989):2.
81. Evgenii Zhiriakov, “A mozhet byt´, vmeste?” Prizyv (21 July 1992): 2.
82. Viktor Golov, “Palekh: Upadok ili vozrozhdenie?” Prizyv (4 July 1995): 2.
83. A. Korneva, “V edinstve dukhovnykh i tvorcheskikh tselei,” Prizyv (10 November 1994)2;
V.Garov, “Plakha dlia Palekha,” Trud (7 October 1989):2.
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covered with graffiti and expletives in grammatically incorrect English. Palekhians
call it “the Coliseum.”84 On the other side of town, the studio in which the masters
had worked since the 1960s — also a large two-story stone structure — is
completely abandoned. Its windows are mostly broken and the weeds and garbage
grow high around its edges. The material foundations for communism had been
decisively and irreversibly abandoned. By 1990, the revolution of October 1917
was overturned — although one would be hard pressed to locate the dramatic
events, the storming of so many Bastilles, typically associated with “revolutions.”
If there was a Bastille in Palekh, it was the Coliseum, and rather than being stormed
it was simply looted before it even opened for business. 
Meanwhile, if the boundaries between imperial and Soviet culture became far
more porous in the Brezhnev period, the same can be said of the dividing lines
between the Soviet and post-Soviet era. Russians continued to mark celebrations of
Palekh’s art in Soviet time. The Russian Federation, aided by funds from the
philanthropist free marketer George Soros, celebrated Palekh’s 75th anniversary in
1999, an event accompanied by national press coverage and exhibits in Moscow
and St. Petersburg. The event took as its beginning point the formation of the Artel
of Ancient Painting in 1924 — rather than a time before 1917, when the Palekhians
first began painting religious icons.85 Similarly, the statue to Lenin, erected in 1956
by a prominent Palekh sculptor, still stands directly across from the Exaltation of
the Cross cathedral in Palekh. In the summer of 2001, its future seemed secure,
which is in stark contrast to the fate of the statue it replaced on the very same
location in February 1917: a bust of the Tsar Liberator Alexander II, which was
unceremoniously tossed into the nearby pond. The bust of Lenin was vandalized in
November 1991, but almost immediately Palekhians re-painted it and local
administrators reminded the hooligans that a native Palekhian, the esteemed Soviet
sculptor Nikolai Dydykin, had created it. Also secure is the elaborate monument
below the Exaltation of the Cross cathedral to the heroic sacrifice of hundreds of
Palekhians killed in the Great Patriotic War. Designed by the same Palekhian who
had made the statue to Lenin, it sits atop the former site of the Aleksandr Nevskii
chapel.86 While that chapel was torn down in the 1930s, the defeat of the Nazis
remains an unchallenged achievement of Soviet power. Only the Soviet victory
over the Nazis rivals the Soviet Palekh jubilee as a festive occasion in the post-
Soviet hamlet.
Attitudes among some artists and art critics have also been very slow to change.
With the collapse of the state monopoly over Palekh art in 1989, the old anti-
capitalist rhetoric immediately asserted itself — though few stopped to consider
that capitalism, even in the Soviet period, had actually underwritten much of the
84. V. Mazurin, “Ne ubit´ by Zhar-ptitsu,” Prizyv (3 April 1997):3.
85. On 21 February 1998 the Soros Fund met in Palekh to discuss its ambitious plans for
funding Palekh’s art and cultural institutions. Tape of meeting in Palekh with the Soros Fund,
21 February 1998, from the personal archive of Mikhail Larionov.
86. O. Zhurikhina, “Ivany, ne pomniashchie rodstva,” Prizyv (6 November 1991):2; “Iz
istorii,” Prizyv (31 July 1993):3.
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village academy and its relatively high standard of living. Viewing the “raskol” in
late 1989, a journalist remarked that, “the firebird has been plucked and thrown on
the frying pan, roasted by the flames of the dispute.” He lamented the dawning of a
new age in which the market and its vulgar corrupting tendencies had finally
triumphed over the anti-market mission of Russian national culture.87 
The degree of intelligentsia anger was matched only by its increasing
irrelevance — which in fact had been noticeable even in Soviet Palekh, where the
hamlet’s production was arguably beholden as much to the market as to the dictates
of scholarly or political control. “The collective [in Palekh] has collapsed,”
proclaimed one prominent party member and master in 1993, who like many other
Palekhians considered himself to be a member of the intelligentsia. “Unhealthy
competition has begun. Some say this is all quite natural… Maybe. But that does
not mean it will always be this way. Everything, good and bad, will pass. That is
life. The present chaos will also pass and a normal life will develop again.” By
normal, of course, the author meant a world where state-controlled organizations
established monopolies in all spheres of economic and creative life — and where
the “desire to own one’s own business” and “make money” had not “destroyed
talented artists” and “corrupted the souls of our children.”88
Curiously, in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union, one hears little in
Palekh about the Soviet regime’s destruction of traditional Russian values — a
favorite topic among many artists in the 1960s. If anything, quite the opposite is true.
The Soviet Union, according to those who look upon the Brezhnev era nostalgically,
played the role of preserver and protector of Russia’s national traditions, which
allowed Palekh to flourish and occupy its rightful place on center stage in Russian
culture. With some justice, the Soviet era has thus been recast in the positive role as
a defender of Russian national culture. Russia, in their view, is again under siege —
this time from the capitalists within, creating a new division of Russia into various
and sundry “appanages” and exposing the nation to foreign domination.89
Creative debates also continue, mirroring earlier debates through much of the
early Soviet period.90 A small group of serious young artists has broken completely
with the notion of Palekh as “folk art.” In the mid-1990s, they displayed a new style
and content in a series of exhibits called “After the Winter,” by which they meant a
rebirth after a prolonged period of stagnation in Palekh art since the early 1960s.91
Interestingly, they drew inspiration from the past generation of militant Soviet
Palekh artists in the 1930s and 1940s who attempted to break away from their
teachers and follow the conventions of socialist realist art. “I would like to think a
87. V. Garov, “Plakha dlia Palekha,” Trud (7 October 1989):2.
88. Ol´ga Kondrat´eva, “Spaset li promysel Rossiiu?” Prizyv (10 September 1992):2;
K.Bokarev, “A chto budet zavtra?” Prizyv (1 July 1993):2.
89. Iurii Melent´ev, “Vernost´ traditsii — fundament edinstva,” Prizyv (20 December 1994): 2.
90. Elena Leonova, “Traditsionnyi avangardist Mikhail Larionov,” Khronometr-Ivanovo (10
March 1999): 10.
91. V. Kotov, “Novyi stil´ i tvorchestvo,” Prizyv (2 February 2001): 4.
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bit about what is happening in the country and the world,” noted one of their
leaders.92 Their ideological platform, like that of their Soviet predecessors, extolled
the virtues of, “modernity, a secular nature, individuality, relevance, and a
freshness of expressed ideas.”93 Like many of the militant Palekh artists of the
1930s, they frequently mocked variations on the Palekh folklore classics as
“plagiarism” (plagiat) and believed its propagation is best left to “the Xerox
machine or computer. It takes less time.”94 
 Even many of the older generation have quickly adapted — and one gets the
impression that the transition post-1991 was actually facilitated rather than
hindered by the Soviet legacy.95 As in the broader Russian Federation economy,
many of today’s New Palekhians were former Komsomol and Party leaders locally.
In the late Soviet period, they belonged to the union of artists, displayed their boxes
at exhibits, and increasingly traveled abroad, where they made friends and potential
business contacts, from which they have benefited in the post-Soviet era. They had
close relations with retail and wholesale outlets in Moscow and Leningrad, which
also gave rise to the capitalist retail and wholesale trade business of Moscow and St.
Petersburg after 1991. 
These formerly card-carrying communists have also found a new source of
authority and patronage, which itself harkens back to their pre-revolutionary
identity. By 2001 they had become regular churchgoers. The head of the Palekh
branch of the union of artists from the 1970s and 1980s, Aleksei Kochupalov, has
built himself a private chapel, which stands beside his palatial two-story home.96
One prominent Soviet-era artist proclaimed that only Palekh had faithfully
preserved the traditions of icon painting.97 That reputation has helped many of the
new “old-timers” — those trained under the Soviets and now growing old in the
Putin era — carve out a “new” identity and livelihood for themselves as painters of
religious icons.98 Meanwhile, Palekh’s two main churches have again become
working churches — one in 1989 and the other in 1992 — and Palekh masters
proudly display their newest works of religious art in these churches for public
admiration and worship. Their Soviet era training as lacquer specialists has thus
served them well in the post-Soviet era.
92. See, for example, the press release announcing the “Posle zimy” exhibit of April 1998.
Personal archive of Mikhail Larionov.
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Confronting the Soviet legacy
Palekh thus presents a picture of the development of Russian national culture in
which the hard and fast dividing line of 1917 is put into a more ambiguous light. At
the same time, Palekh suggests a far more fluid and dynamic relationship between
Soviet power and the production of “official” culture than is often assumed.
Relying on market forces and consumer tastes, the Palekh artists carved out for
themselves a significant place in Soviet Russian society. The masters of Palekh
drew from a legacy of romantic national culture from the imperial period. Rather
than images of factory or urban life, they represented romantic visions of the
Russian countryside, an ethos of rural craftsmanship, and Russian folk heroes and
legends. If the regime had occasionally condemned such tendencies in its first
decades, it abandoned all such efforts by the 1960s and officially sanctioned the
“traditional” direction in Palekh’s art. From the regime’s perspective, Palekh was
too valuable as a source of foreign currency, despite the suspect ideological
foundations of its art and its link to foreign, bourgeois consumers. Moreover, when
it came to building a sense of loyalty to the Soviet state few other forces on the
cultural scene, especially Western popular culture or the avant-garde, seemed to
provide a viable alternative.99 Palekh’s traditional art seemed to fit the parameters
of an “intelligible” art form grounded in the supposed principles of Leninist
nationalities policies. A supposedly primordial Russianness, rather than class
affiliation or international solidarity, thus became the main building block of
identity for the Russian heartland in the late Soviet era. 
The regime’s decision to co-opt nostalgic yearnings and Russian national
symbols struck a responsive chord in the population. In the post-war era, as the
heroic phase of the revolution receded further into the national memory, many
Russians increasingly experienced an intense feeling of cultural loss. That feeling
was a product of the revolution itself and was accentuated by the destruction of the
Nazi invasion. 
Not surprisingly, many Russians today look back upon the Brezhnev era as a
time when Russian national traditions were nurtured and protected. This feeling
stands in stark contrast to the state’s seeming abandonment of the Russian nation
after 1991. For many, the communist party, the single largest party in Putin’s
Russia, represents the party of the Russian nation. With the collapse of the Soviet
state, Russian national culture, in the eyes of many, has been “orphaned” by the
state. Far from feeling “liberated,” many Palekh artists find the withering away of
the state’s cultural mission intensely disillusioning and disorienting. The
expectation of state approval and intervention continues to linger. Even more
surprising, despite Palekh’s long-standing dependence on the market, the masters
retain a deep suspicion of capitalism, an attitude encouraged by seventy years of
99. Andrei Amalrik, Will the Soviet Union survive until 1984?, op. cit.:39. 
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intense anti-capitalist propaganda.100 A key aspect of Russian national identity as it
developed in the Soviet period has therefore been severed — its link to the state.
And to add insult to injury, Russians must adapt to a world where community and
identity are now almost exclusively beholden to the market. Perhaps the Palekh
masters, like many Russians, will thrive economically in the new environment of
cultural and economic laissez-faire, but many will not find that sense of national




Niagara University, NY 14109
ajenks@niagara.edu
100. V. Kotov, “Tak chto zhe my vytvoriaem?” Prizyv (27 June 1992):2; V. Kotov, “Est´ li
budushchee u sela-akademii?” Prizyv (27 December 1994):2; V. Kotov, “Mif o sele-
akademii,” Prizyv (9 September 1995):2; V.Kotov, “Narodnoe li iskusstvo ‘Palekh’,” Prizyv
(23 December 1995):2.
